Georgetown University Law Center

Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW

2000

Secret Evidence Repeal Act of 1999, Part 2:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
106th Cong., May 23, 2000 (Statement of David D.
Cole, Prof. of Law, Geo. U. L. Center)
David Cole
Georgetown University Law Center, cole@law.georgetown.edu

CIS-No.: 2000-H521-126.3
This paper can be downloaded free of charge from:
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cong/5

This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author.
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cong
Part of the Courts Commons, Immigration Law Commons, and the Legislation Commons

SECKEr EVIDENCE REPEAL ACT OF 1999,

PART

n

HEARING
BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
HOUSE 'OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON

H.R.2121
MAY 23, 2UOO

Serial No. 97

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
6&-821

-

WASHINGTON: 2000

For oale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documente, Congreoslonal Salea Office. Wa8hlngton. DC 20402

---.------"

-----

COMMITI'EE ON THE JUDICIARY
HENRY J. HYDE,
F. JAMES SENSENBRE~NER, JR.,
Wisconsin
BILL McCOLLUM, Florida
GEORGE W. GEKAS, Pennsylvania
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina
LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas
ELTON GALLEGLY, California
CHARLES T. CANADY, Florida
BOB GOODLA'M'E, Virginia
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
BOB BARR, Georgia
WILLIAM L. JENKINS, Tennessee
ASA HUTCHINSON, Arkansas
EDWARD A. PEASE, Indiana
CHRIS CANNON, Utah
JAMES E. ROGAN, California
LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina
MARY BONO, California
SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama
JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida
DAVID VI'M'ER, Louisiana

Illinois, Chairman
JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan
BARNEY FRANK, Ma88achusetta
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
RICK BOUCHER, Virginia
JERROLD NADLER, New York
ROBERT C. SCO'M', Virginia
MELVIN L. WA'M', North Carolina
ZOE WFGREN, California
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
MAXINE WATERS, California
MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Mll88llchusetta
WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetta
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey
TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York

.
•

TUOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Genual Counsel·Chkf of Staff
JULIAN EPSTEIN, Minority Chkf Counsel and Staff Director

•

(II)

CONTENTS
HEARING DATE
Page

May 23, 2000 ................................................................................. :........................ ..

1

OPENING STATEMENT
Hyde Hon. Henry J., a Representative in Congress From the State of Illinois,
and chairman, Committee on the Judiciary ..................................................... .

1

WITNESSES
AI-Ariant!lfahla A., relative of detained alien ..................................................... ..
Bonior, Hon. David E., a Representative in Congress From the State of

Ca~:~fi.nH~~:· T~;;;:' ~. &p~~~~~i~ti~~'i~'c~~~~~~' ~~~'th~' St~t;;· ~f' c~iif~~:

nia ......................................................................................................................... .
Cole, David, Professor, Georgetown University Law Center ............................. ..
Cooper, Bo, General Counsell Immigration and Naturalization Service .......... ..
Emerson, Steven, executive Clirector, Terrorism Newswire ................................ .
Flatow, Stephen, victim of terrorism .................................................................... .
Homburger, Thomas, National Executive Committee, Anti-Defamation

~:;!e&~~:~yf:~~;;~~it~~:i~~i~~~~i~~~~~~:~i~i::Li~~;~~::ti~{~~::::::::::::

Parkinson, Larry R., General Counsel, Federal Bureau of Investigation ......... ..
Ramer, Bruce, president, American Jewish Committee ...................................... .

86
6
8

62
19
92
83
76
80
46
13
66

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING

./

AI-Arian, Nahla A., relative of detained alien: Prepared statement ................. ..
Campbell, Hon. Tom, a Representative in Congress From the State of California: Prepared statement ..................................................................................... .
Cole, DaVId, Professor, Georgetown University Law Center: Prepared statement ..................................................................................................................... .
Cooper, Bo, General Counsel, Immigration and Naturalization Service: Prepared statement .................................................................................................. .
Emerson, Steven, executive director, Terrorism Newswire: Prepared statement ..................................................................................................................... .
Flatow, Stephen, victim of terrorism: Prepared statement ................................ ..
Homburger, Thomas, National Executive Committee, Anti-Defamation

H::te~~~~:::;~ ~~~::!!e~~ti~~·i~·c~~····~~~·~~~·th~·st;;t;;·~f'nii~~i~:

and chairman, Committee on the Judiciary: f1;epared statement .................. .
Kiareldeen, HanY'rformerly detained alien: PrepN'ed statement ...................... ..
Nojeim Gregory ., legislative counsel, American Civil Liberties Union: Prepared statement .................................................................................................. .
Parkinson, Larry R., General Counsel, Federal Bureau of Investigation: Prepared statement .................................................................................................. .
Ramer, Bruce, president, American Jewish Committee: Prepared statement .. .

87
11

64

21
94
84
77
3
82

47

16
68

APPENDIX
Material submitted for the record ......................................................... :................

(Ill)

119

62
under certain circumstances, to bypass the requirement that an unclassified summary be provided to a potential deportee of classified information that serves as the
basis for the action against him. In addition, the Justice Department may at some
point issue new guidelines as to procedures for the use of classified information in
nnmigration proceedings, an effort that we hope will provide greater clarity and assure less opportunity for abuse.
IV. CONCLUSION

In SUl.ll, the tack taken by the pending bill is untenable. H.R.2121 makes no accommodation whatl;Qever to the national securit'lr concerns to which the Alien Terrorist Removal Act was addressed. Its categorical ban on the use of classified information in immigration proceedings fails to draw the balance between due process
concerns and naiional security interests for which AJC advocated during Congress'
consideration of til!; Antiterrorism Act in which those provisions were included. We
\lIge this COIDJ.nittee, and the Congress as a whole, to reject the Secret Evidence Repeal Act and to adopt a more balanced approach.

Mr. HYDE. Professor Cole.
STATEMENT OF PROFESSOR DAVID COLE, GEORGETOWN
UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER
Mr. COLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have represented 13 people in the last 13 years against whom the INS has sought to use

secret evidence, and I think. the record in those cases belies the testimony of Mr. Parkinson and Mr. Cooper that the government only
uses secret evidence where there are true threats to national security and, therefore, we can trust the government with this remarkable power that it has taken upon itself.
Of the 13 people that I have represented, all 13 were at one time
alleged by the government to be threats to national security. Yet
in none of those cases did the secret evidence charge the alien with
engaging in any criminal activity, much less terrorist activity. In
every case, the basic charge was guilt by association, not that they
did something wrong, but they were associated-with the wrong
people.
,
Twelve of those 13 people are now living freely and peaceably in
the United States with no apparent undermining of the national
security. The thirteenth case, involving Mr. Mazen Al-Na.ijar is still
pending.
In every case that has reached final resolution, the courts have
ruled against the INS, and the INS has forgone appeals available
to it.
I want to briefly touch on some of the stories in those cases, but
first I want to make one legal point, going to the initial exchange
between Mr. Chairman and Congressman Campbell regarding due
process and aliens.
The Supreme Court has said absolutely clearly that due process
protects all persons. It talks about persons. All persons in the
United States, whether citizen or alien, whether here illegally or legally. And the case is Matthews v. Diaz. It is cited in footnote 4
of my testimony. So ,there is no distinction between aliens and citizens and there is no distinction between illegal aliens and legal _
aliens.
.
Secondly, the Supreme CoUrt has repeatedly said that the due
process clause prOVIdes no lesser protections for aliens than for citi.
zens.
In Galvin v. Press, an immigration case, the Supreme Court said
that since the alien is a person, an alien has the same protection
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for his life, liberty and property under the due process clause as
is afforded the citizen. The Supreme Court said the same thing in
Kwong Hai Chew: ''The fifth amendment knows no distinction between citizens and aliens residing in the United States."
.
Mr. Cooper erroneously misled this committee in saying that the
Supreme Court has sanctioned this practice as constitutional for 50
years. The case he referred to is Jay v. Boyd. In that case the Supreme Court said no constitutional claim is presented. No constitutional claim was presented.
In 1953, the Supreme Court decided in Kwong Hai Chew v.
Colding, in which a constitutional challenge to the use of secret
evidence was presented, that the secret evidence could not be used
to expel an alien who was living here.
It is interesting that Mr. Cooper twice conceded, both in his
opening remarks and in his response to questions, that the INS
cannot constitutionally use secret evidence to establish deportability. That is precisely what the 1996 Alien Terrorist Removal Act
allows the INS to do. What Mr. Ramer has said this committee
should look to, the INS has conceded here is unconstitutional.
Now just a couple of remarks about some of these cases, because
I think it is a record that really speaks for itself.
Nasser Ahmed, an Egyptian man locked up for 3V2 years released in November in New York: When he was initially locked up,
the INS told him they couldn't tell him anything, not a word about
the secret evidence a~ainst him. When we brought a constitutional
challenge to the INS s practice, all of a sudden they found themselves able to divulge pages and pages of information which they
previously said couldn't even be summarized without jeopardizing
national security.
,
The immigration judge ultimately found that he didn't pose a
threat to national security, the BlA affirmed, and Janet Reno declined to intervene and overturn that finding. And he was released.
Hany Kiareldeen, to my left, locked up for 19 months as a threat
to national security: Again, initially told almost nothing about why
he was locked up. Ultimately, all seven immigration judges who
looked at the complete record in case found there was no basis to
conclude that Mr. Kiareldeen was a threat to national security, and
what became clear is that the principal source that the FBI relied
upon was his ex-wife who was in a custody proceeding with him
and had made repeated false accusations against him.
Fouad Rafeedie, another Palestinian: The INS sought to expel
him on the basis of secret evidence that he was associated with the
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. That is all he was
told. He was not alleged to have engaged. in any illegal activity on
their behalf. The District Court for the District of Columbia and
the D.C. Circuit for the District of Columbia held that the use of
secret evidence against him was unconstitutional, the government
declined to take an appeal, and let him remain in this country.
Imad Hamad, a Palestinian in Dearborn: The government sought
to use secret evidence to oppose his application for permanent resident status. The evidence showed only that he had attended a Palestinian dinner. The jmmigration judge found that there vyas nothing there that showed that he was a threat to national security.
The BlA affirmed.
o
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The Los Angeles Eight, a group of seven Palestinians and a Kenyan woman who were arrested In 1987 and locked up in a maximum security prison: The INS charged that they all posed a threat
to national security and had to be detained based on secret evi
dence. The immigration judge refused to consider secret evidence.
Did the government appeal? No. It just let them ill out, all eight,
~ho it origi.nally said could not be freed without jeopardizing natIonal secunty.
A month later, FBI Director William Webster testified in Congress that the FBI had found no evidence that any of these people
had engaged in any criminal or terrorist activity. All eight have
now been out for 13 years. ·rne INS has granted three of them permanent resident status.
, Finally, Mr. Mazen AI-Najjar, the one pending case, still detained: The only thing he has ever been told is that he is alleged
to be associated with a terrorist organization. They have not said
how he is associated, what he did, they have never charged him
with any criminal conduct, notwithstanding 5 years of criminal investi~ation in that case.
ThIS record, I think illustrates that when you give the government this kind of power, when you give them the power to use secret evidence to present evidence behind closed doors which they
know will not be challenged, you cannot trust them. Our Constitution and our legal system are not based on trust of the government;
they are based on a notion that what best serves everyone's interest is an open process in which everyone can see the evidence, in
which the evidence can be challenged and in which the truth can
be discerned.
Justice Frankfurter said, no better test for discerning the truth
has ever been divulged than the opportunity to confront the evidence and cross-examine adverse witnesses. This procedure denies
that test for truth. So even if we are concerned-and we should be
concerned about terrorist threats-why should we sanction a procedure which is designed to get the wrong people, as it did in the
cases of all the people that I have represented?
Mr. HYDE. Could you bring it-you are through?
Mr. COLE. I have come to my conclusion.
Mr. HYDE. Thank you very much, Professor Cole.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cole follows:]
I

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PROFESSOR DAVID COLE, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAw
CENTER
INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairmafi, members of the Committee, I thank you for inviting me to testify
on the use of secret evidence in immigration proceedings. 1 I have an unfortunately
long experience with this practice. Since 1987, I have represenW 13 aliens against
whom the INS has sought to use secret evidence. At one time, the INS claimed that
all 13 posed a direct threat to the security of the nation, and that the evidenc'! to
support that assertion could not be revealed-in many instances could not even be
summarized-without jeopardizing national security. Yet in none of· these cases did
the INS's secret evidence even allege, much J.ess prove, that the alieps had engaged
in or sUJlported any criminal, much le88 terrorist, activity. In most cases, the ~ov
ernment s allegations, once revealed, consisted of no more than guil~ byass.l>clation:
1 I speak here in my personal capacity, and not as a representative of Georgetown University
Law Center or any other entity or person.

III
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it claimed that the aliens were associated with disfavored "terrorist" groups, but not
that they actually engaged in or furthered any terrorist activity themselves.
Today, one of the 13 remains in prison as his case is still pending. All the other
clients are free, living a law-abiding and peaceable existence here in the United
States, without any adverse consequences to the security of the nation. In every case
that has reached a final determination, the INS has lost. Where the cases have been
resolved in the federal courts, the courts have declared the use of secret evidence
unconstitutional. Where the cases have been resolved in the immigration process,
immigration judges have uniformly rejected the government's national security
claims as unwarranted.
In the meantime, however, substantial harm has been done. Nasser Ahmed, an
Egyptian man living in New York, spent 3 and V2 years of his life incarcerated, mllst
of it in solitary confinement, before his release last.J~ovember, when the Attorney
General declined to overrule the Board of Immigration""Appeals' ruling that he did
not pose _a threat to national security and should be released. Hany Kiareldeen, a
Palestinian from New Jersey, spent a year and a half in detention before the BIA
and a federal court ordered his release in October 1999. And Mazen AI Najjar, a
Palestinian from Tampa, Florida whose case is still pending, has been detained for
three years, without criminal charges and on the basis of evidence he has never
seen.
.
But it is not simply years of human beings' lives that have been lost. More broadly, America's image as a country that cares about fairness, openness, and due process has been seriously tarnished. Secret evidence is a tactic one associates with totalitarian regimes and military juntas, not free democracies. A remedy is needed,
and H.R. 2121 is it.
.
The use of secret evidence poses insuperable challenges to the administration of
justice. First, and most fundamentally, it is simply not possible to hold a fair adversary proceeding where one side presents its evidence behind closed doors. The adversary process is the best mechanism for determining the truth that we have yet
identified, but it depends on each side being able to examine and respond to the
other's evidence. Accordingly, every court to address the use of secret evidence in
immigration proceedings in the last decade has declared it unconstitutional.
Second, the INS's use of secret evidence contains practically no safeguards against
abuse. It uses secret evidence against people who do not pose any threat to the national security, because in its view eVIdence can be submitted behind closed doors
whenever it is classified and relevant, even if the individual involved does not himself pose a threat to national security. It uses secret evidence where there is no legitimate need for the evidence to be secret, because it has been improperly classified
by another agencY and the INS has no authority to declassify. It uses secret evidence where it has no affirmative statutory authority to do so, such as in detaining
aliens without bond. It has failed to keep any record of many of its secret evidence
presentations, thereby defeating meaningful review. And while the INS has occasionally provided aliens with declassified summaries of its secret evidence, neither
statute nor regulation requires such a l'roduction, nor that the summary provided
afford the alien a meaningful opportunity to respond. Accordingly, summaries are
often not provided at all, and when provided, are often so general as to be entirely
unhelpful.
Third, reliance on secret evidence that cannot be challenged by one's adversarIes
leads the government to engage in sloppy practices that would never be tolerated
were it required to make its case in open court. As far as I can determine, the INS
has relied almost entirely on hearsay presentations by FBI agents, and has failed
to produce any original declarants, even in the clo!led-door proceedings. The FBI
agents' presentations have sometimes taken the form of barebones assertions, not
even providing the judge with sufficient information to make an independent assessment of the reliability of or basis for the allegations. And the INS and FBI have
relied on innuendo and rumor, even where its own records raise serious questions
about the validity of its charges.
Fourth, there has never been any showing that the use of secret evidence is necessary. In no other setting is the government permitted to deprive someone of hib
liberty without affording him a meaningful opportunity to respond to the pvidence
against him. In criminal cases, secret evidence is never pernutted, no matter how
serious the charges, and no matter how much confidential or classified information
the government has implicating the defendant. This rule applies to the prosecution
of terrorists, spies, and mass murderers. We have survived as a nation for over 200
years abiding by that basic rule of due process. There is no reason we cannot and
should not extend the sarne rule to inunigrants when we seek to deprive them of
their liberty and either imprison them or deport them.
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Finally, the use of secret evidence is counterproductive. It poisoDB the truth-finding process, so we cannot even be certain of whether we have properly identified

threats to national security. It embroils the government in protracted litigation because the adversary process is ill-suited to this practice. And most problematically,
it encourages cynicism, paranoia, and distrust in immigrant communities, because .
closed-door proceedings understandably make people fear the worst. That paranoia
and distrust in turn impedes the ability of law enforcement to identify true threats
in immigrant communities, because it means that the FBI and INS will be viewed
as enemy rather than protector.
I support H.R. 2121 because it seeks wend this practice. It would repeal existing
statutory authorio/ for the use of secret evidence to deport aliens, to deny them reliei from deportation, or to detain them. Its premise is that the practice cannot be
mended, and therefore should simply be ended. I agree with that premise, because
at bottom the use of secret evidence cannot be squared with the due process guarantee of notice and a fair hearing. In this testimony, I will show why that is so P.i!
a matter of constitutional law and illustrate why it is so by pointing to the INS's
dismal track record in secret evidence cases.
1. A CASE STUDY

I want to begin with a case study. Hany Kiareldeen is a thirty-one year (,ld Palestinian who came to the United States on a student visa in 1990 and lives in Newark, New Jersey. From March 1998 to October 1999, he spent 19 months in prison
solely on the basis of secret evidence-an uncorroborated bare-bones hears.,y report-that neither he nor his lawyers ever have had an opportunity to see.
In 1997, Kiareldeen applied for adjustment of status to permanent resident based
on his marriage to a U.S. citizen. On March 26, 1998, however, without ruling on
his application for permanent resident status, the INS arrested Kiareldeen, charged
him with being deportable for failing to maintain his student visa status, and took
him into custody as a threat to national security.
Kiareldeen has never seen the only evidence that the IN!;! ever offered to justify
his detention, because the INS presented it in camera and ex parte. According to
the undisputed claims of the immigration judges who reviewed It, however, the secret evidence consisted of a report prepared by an FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force
relaying extremely ~eneral hearsay allegations. Declassified summaries of the evidence provided to Kiareldeen disclosed three allegations: (1) that Kiareldeen was associated with an unidentified "terrorist organization," and "maintains relationships"
with other members and "suspected members" of "terrorist organizations," also unidentified; (2) that "(an unidentified] source advised" that about a week before the
World Trade Center ("WTC") bombing, Kiareldeen hosted a meeting at his residence
in Nutley, New Jersey, where some individuals discussed plans to bomb the World
Trade Center; and (3) that "[an unidentified] source advised Kiareldeen expressed
a desire to murder Attorney General Janet Reno." The INS never introduced any
evidence in open court to substantiate any of these allegations. Kiareldeen v. Reno,
1999 WL 956289, *15 (D. N.J. Oct. 20, 1999).
The immigration judge handling Kiareldeen's case initially ruied, in May 1997,
that the government's secret evidence justified his detention as a security threat.
At that time, the INS told Kiareldeen only that the evidence showed that he was
associated with terrorists and posed a threat to the Attorney General, charges so
general that he could not possibly rebut them.
After Kiareldeen obtained more detailed summaries of the evidence, he did rebut
the government's case in open court. He proved, for examplek. that he did not even
live in the apartment where he supposedly met with World 'll'ade Center bombers
until a year and a half after the alleged meeting took place. (The FBI's own records
confirmed this fact.) He also showed that one of the SOll'C6S of secret evidence
ag~nst him, his ex-wife, had made numerous false allegations against him in the
course of a custody battle over their child. Kiareldeen sought to examine his ex-wife
in open court, but the INS vigorously opposed his attempts to do so, and she refused
to testify about her discussions with the FBI.
Seven immi~ation judges ultimately examined Kiareldeen's case on the complete
record, including the government's secret evidence presentation and Kiareldeen's
open court rebuttal-the judge who Conducted the immigration hearing and two separate three-judge panels of the Board of Immigration Ap~. It is rare for any
judge-even an Article ill judge-to reject to a claim of national security by the federal government. Yet in this case, all seven jud,res flatly rejected the government's
contention that Kiareldeen posed a threat to national security.
Two judges directly diSCUBSed the quality of the government's evidence. The Immigration Judge who presided at trial, Daniel Meisner, stated that Kiareldeen had.
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"raised formidable doubts about the veracity of the allegations contained in the
[~assified information]," and that in the face of repeated requests for more informatIOn, the INS had refused "to answer those doubts with any additional evidence, be
it at the public portion of the hearing or even in camera." Matter of Kiareldeen,
A77-025-332, Decision of Immigration Judge (Apr. 2, 1999). He concluded that the
classified evidence was Utoo meager to provide reasonable grounds to believe that
[KiareldeenJ was actually involved in any terrorist activity." [d.
BIA Judge Anthony Moscato, dissenting from a preliminary bond panel dedsion
not to release Kiareldeen, wrote that the bare-bones character of the government's
in camera evidence made it "impossible" for the BIA to exercise independent judgment in assessing "either the absolute truth or the relative probity of the evidence
contained in the classified information." Matter of Kiareldeen, A77-025-332, Decision of BIA Denying Request to Lift Stay of Release Order (June 29, 1999) (Moscato,
J., dissenting). Judge Moscato criticized the INS for having provided no original
source material and UUttle in the way of specifics regarding the source or context
of the classified information." [d. He further noted that despite the immigration
judge's continuing requests, the INS had provided ~no witnesses, neither confidential informant nor federal agent, to explain or document the context of the actions
and statements referenced in the classified information or to document the way in
which the classified information became known to the source of that information."
[d. at 1-2.2
.
On August 18, 1999, Kiareldeen filed a habeas c('rpus petition in federal district
court in New Jersey, arguing that the use of secret evidence to deprive him of his
liberty pending resolution of the deportation proceedings was both unauthorized by
statute and unconstitutional. On October 20, 1999, the district court granted the petition and issued a writ of habeas corpus. The court ruled that the INS's reliance
on secret evidence violated Kiareldeen's due process right to a fair hearing, finding
that "reliance on secret evidence raises serious issues about the integrity of the adversarial process, the impossibility of self-defense against undisclosed charges, and
the reliability of government processes initiated and prosecuted in darkness."
Kiareldeen v. ReM, 1999 WL 956289, *11 (D.N.J. Oct. 20, 1999). The court also
ruled that Kiareldeen had been deprived of his due process rights because the secret
evidence at issue consisted of uncorroborated hearsay that "could not be tested for
reliability" and did not allow the immigration judges "to conduct a meaningful administrative review." [d. at *14-18. The court ordered Kiareldeen's immediate release.
Later the same day, a three-judge bond panel of the BIA also ordered Kiareldeen's
release, unanimously rejecting the INS's appeal of the immigration judge's decision
to grant bond, and lifting its prior preliminary stay of Kiareldeen's release. Five
days earlier, on October 15, 1999, a separate three-judge merits panel had unanimously affirmed the immigration judge's decision granting Kiareldeen permanent
resident status, also finding that Kiareldeen had successfully rebutted the INS'
.
.
charges against him. 3
After obtaining temporary stays of Kiareldeen's release from the Attorney General
and a Third Circuit judge, the INS decided, on October 25, 1999, not to pursue further appeals available to it, and rel~ased Kiareldeen. The INS apparently concluded,
after contending for more than a year and a half that Kiareldeen posed a national
security threat, that he did not even pose a sufficient threat to justify pursuing its
appeals. Kiareldeen is now a permanent resident alien, but has never received even
an apology from the INS for taking a year and a half of his liberty from him.
Kiareldeen's case is just one of many stories that could be told. I will now turn
to the range of legal and practical problems raised by the INS's use of secret evidence.
II. THE USE OF SECRET EVIDENCE VIOLATES DUE PROCESS

The use of secret evidence denies an alien the most basic guarantees of due process: notice of the evidence against him and a meaningful opportunity to rebut it.
2 The other two judges on this panel declined to lift the stay of Kiareldeen's release order
pending appeal, but did not dispute in any respect Judge Moscato's characterization of the evi-
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Under the BIA's rules, separate panels consider appeals of bond determinations and appeHls
of the merits of deportation proceedings. 8 C.F.R. §3.19(d); 8 U.S.C. § 1226; Gornika v. INS, 681
F.2d 501, 505 (5th Cir. 1982).
3
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Accordingly, every court to address the issue in the last decade has found this practice unconstitutional. 4
As the Supreme Court has stated:
Certain principles have remained relatively immutable in our jurisprudence.
One of these is that where governmental action serious!tn~ures an individual
and the reasonableness of the action depends on fact fin' .t.the evidence used
to prove the Government's case must be disclosed to the inaividual so that he
has an opportunity to show that it is untrue.
Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. at 496. "'Fairness can rarely be obtained I:>Y secret, onesided determination of facts decisive of riJdlts.'" Goss v. Lopez 419 U.S. 565, 580
(1975) (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 170
(1951) (Frankfurter, J. concurrin~).
Accordingly, even in ordinary Clvillitigation where physical liberty is not at stake,
"it is . . . the firmly held mam rule that a court may not dispose of the merits of
a case on the basis of ex parte, in camera submissions." Abourezk v. Reagan, 785
F.2d 1043, 1061 (D.C. Cir. 1986), affd, 484 U.S. 1 (1987); see also Kinoy v. Mitchell,
67 F.R.D. I, 15 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (refusing to grant summary judgment on the basis
of materials submitted in camera, because "[o]ur system of justice does not encompass ex parte determinations on the merits of cases in civil liti~ation"). "[Tlhe very
foundation of the adversary process assumes that use of undisclosed information
will violate due process," and therefore "use of undisclosed information in adJudications should be presumytively unconstitutional." American-Arab Anti-Discrimmation
Committee v. Reno, (ADC v. Reno), 70 F.3d 1045, 1069-70 (9th Cir. 1995).6
Applying these principles, a federal district court recently declared unconstitutional the use of secret evidence to detain aliens without bond. In Kiareldeen v.
Reno, 1999 WL 956289 (D.N.J. Oct. 20, 1999), the district court granted habeas corpus relief to an alien who had been detained by INS on the basis of secret evidence
allegedly demonstrating that he was a threat to national security. As noted above,
the court found that "reliance on secret evidence raises serious doubts about the integrity of the adversarial process, the impossibility of self-defense against undisclosed charges) and the reliability of government processes initiated and prosecuted
in darkness." Id. at *11.
\
The Court in Kiareldeen followed the two most recent federal appellate court decisions reviewing INS attempts to use secret evidence in immigration proceedings,
both of which also held thejractice unconstitutional. In 1988, the INS asserted national security concerns an sought to rely on secret evidence of Fouad Rafeedie's
alleged high-rank:imr membership in the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), an allegedly terrorist group, to exclude him from the country upon
his return from a trip abroad. A district court preliminarily enjoined the INS's actions on due ~roceBB grounds, and the D.C. Circuit affirmed the injunction. Rafeedie
v. INS, 688 F. Supp. 729 (D.D.C. 1988), affd in part, rev'd in part, and remanded,
880 F.2d 506 (D.C. Cir. 1989). On remand, the district court granted summary judgment and held that the INS's attempt to rely on secret evidence violated due process. Rafeedie v. 1NSl.. 795 F. Surp, 13 (D. D.C. 1992). The INS chose not to appeal,
and abandoned its enort to expe Rafeedie.
In Rafeedie, every judge to review the INS's actions found "'the government's
basic position . . . profoundly troubling.'" Rafeedie, 880 F.2d at 525 (Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, J., concurring). The district court found that such a procedure "aft'ord[s]
virtually none of the procedural protections designed to minimize the risk that the
4The due process Clause protects all persons living in this country, whether citizen or alien.
It protects even aliens Jiving here unlawfully:
There are literally millions of aliens within the jurisdiction of the United States. The
Fifth Amendment, as well as the FouIWenth Amendment, protects every one of these
persons from deprivations of life, l;tJerty, or property without due process of law. Even
one whose presence in this country is unlaWfUl, involuntary, or tTYUl8itory is entitled to
that constitutional prorection.
.
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976) (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also !.eng May
Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 187 (1958) ("our immigration laws have long made a distinction
between those aliens who have come to our shores seeking admission . . . and those who are
within the United States after an ent?" irrespective of its legality."); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S.
522, 530 (1954) ("since he is a 'person, an alien has the same ,r-rotection for his life, liberty and
property under the Due Process Clause 88 is afforded a citizen. ).
6A later decision in ADe v. Reno, addressing a separate selective prosecution claim, was reversed and vacated by the Supreme Court under the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Reno v. American·Arab Anti·Discrimination Comm., _U.S._,
119 S. Ct. 936 (1999), but that decision had no bearing on the 1995 decision's holding on the
use of secret evidence.
'
'
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government may err." Rafeedie, 795 F. Supp. at 19. The court of appeals compared
the position of an alien having to disprove charges based on secret information to
that of Joseph K in Franz Kafka's The Trial, and stated that "[ilt is difficult to
imagine how even someone innocent of all wrongdoing could meet such a bnrden."
Rafeedie, 880 F.2d at 516.
.
1n 1995, the ~th Circuit unanimously held that the INS could not constitutionally rely on ~sclosed information to deny legalization, an immigration benefit, to two aliens accused of associating with a terrorist organization. ADC v. Reno,
70 F.3d at 1066-71. The Ninth Circuit held that "[o]nly the most extraordinary circumstances could support one-sided process." [d. at 1070. The fact that the government asserted national security and charged aliens with membership in a terrorist
organization was not sufficient to justify reliance on secret evidence. [d. Again, the
government chose not to pursue further appeals, and granted the aliens legalization.
These cases in turn followed Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953),
in which the Supreme Court relied on due process concerns to interpret an INS regulation not to permit the use of secret evidence to exclude aliens who live here and
have due process protections. Chew was a lawful permanent resident of the United
States who had left the country for four months as a seaman on a merchant vessel.
Upon his return, he was threatened with permanent exclusion based on an immigration regulation that allowed the exclusion of aliens on the basis of confidential
information without a hearing. To avoid a "constitutional conflict" with the Due
Process Clause, the Supreme Court construed the regulation not to apply to returning lawful resident aliens, who have due process rights. [d. at 600-03.
These cases establish a simple propoSItion: the use of secret evidence cannot be
squared with due process. It makes a mockery of the adversary process. Ordinarily,
aliens have a right to confront all the evidence against them, and to cross-examine
the government's witnesses. In secret evidence J,)roceedings, the alien cannot crossexamine, and often has no idea even of what the charges against him are. Ordinarily, aliens can object to the introduction of evidence in immigration proceedings;
where evidence is produced in secret, the alien cannot make any objections, because
he cannot know what the evidence consists of. Ordinarily, an alien is provided with
notice of the charges against hinI; in a secret evidence proceeding he is not. In short,
all of the requisites of a fair adversarial process are abandoned when the government is free to introduce its evidence behind closed doors.
The government generally cites three cases in arguing that it is constitutional to
use secret evidence in deportation proceedings. None provides the support the government seeks. The first, Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345 (1956), expressly disclaimed any
constitutional holding. The case presented onlr a statutory challenge to the use of
secret evidence to deny suspension of deportatIon as a matter of discretion, and the
Court expressly noted that the alien had presented no constitutional challenge. Jay,
351 U.S. at 357 n.21. Quite plainly, a case that does not even present a constitutional claim cannot resolve that claim. The other two cases the government cites,
from the Fifth and Eighth Circuits, engage in virtually no constitutional analysis.
They each dismiss the due process issue in a paragraph by misreading Jay v. Boyd
as if it decided the constitutional issue, wholly disregarding the fact that the Court
in Jay explicitly said it was not deciding that issue. 6
In hearings before the Immigration Subcommittee in February, Deputy (kneral
Counsel for the FBI argued in defense of the use of secret evidence that while aliens
are entitled to due process in immigration proceedings, they are not necessarily entitled to the full panoply of due process rights that citizens must be afforded when
their liberty is deprived. No precedent supports a sliding scale of procednral due
process protections depending on whether the person being deprived of his liberty
IS citizen or noncitizen. But even if there were, it would not support the use of secret
evidence, which deprives its targets not of some sort of deluxe options but of the
most basic elements of due process: notice and a meaningful opportunity to defend
oneself.

m.

THE INS'S USE OF SECRET EVIDENCE IS DEVOID OF MEANINGFUL SAFEGUARDS

The basic due process problem with relying on secret evidence is exacerbated by
the fact that the INS's regulations and procedures contain no meaningful safeguards
against its abuse. And as the INS's track record illustrates, the abuses have been
endemic.
6 United States ex rei. Barbour v. District Director, 491 F.2d 573, 578 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 873 (1974); Suciu v. INS, 755 F.2d 127, 128 (8th Cir. 1985). Indeed, the court in Suciu
acknowledged that "as a matter of fairness and logic, the [due process] argument has considerable appeaI,H but then erroneously considered it "foreclosed" by Jay v. Boyd. Id.
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A. The Use of Secret Evidence is Not Restricted to Individuals Posing a Threat to

National Security
First, the INS does not limit its use of secret evidence to national security risks.
Its re~ations permit it to use this extraordinary procedure anytime that it has
classified evidence relevant to an application for an immigration benefit. If the INS
had. classified ~vi~ence that an indiVld.ual's marria~ was not.bon~de, for example,
an Issue that m Itself poses no secunty concern, Its regulations would nonetheless
permit it to present that evidence behind closed doors. There is no requirement that
It first attempt to make its case without relying on secret evidence. And most problematically, there is no requirement thllt it limit its use of this procedure to individuals who truly pose a threat to national securi~, such as, for example, individuals
who have committed or were planning to comnut criminal conduct threatening national security.
~ordingly, the INS us~d secret evidence in 1997 t? oppose Imad H~ad's application for permanent reSident status, even thou~ Its evidence (which it subsequently disclosed because it was im£~.irly classified), showed no more than that
Hamad had attended a Palestinian . er/dance, on the basis of which the INS argued that he was associated with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.
Both an immigration judge and the BIA held that this evidence did not !lUpport denying Mr. Hamad acljustment of statusl !IDd the INS did not pursue further appeals.
Mr. Hamad now lives in Dearborn, Micnigan.
More frequently, the INS maintains that individuals pose a threat to national security when the INS's own subsequent actions make clear that the evidence simply
does not support the charge. Thus, in 1987, the INS arrested eight aliens in Los
Angeles, charged them as deportable for being members of a group that advocated
world communism, and sought to detain them as national security threats on secret
evidence. When the immigration judge refused to take evidence in camera and ex
parte, the INS simply allowed the eight to go free, belying its national security
claims. At the same time, then, then-li'BI Director William Webster testified that
an FBI investigation had found no evidence of terrorist or criminal conduct on the
part of any of the eight, that the:y were arrested for their political affiliations with
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and that if they had been
U.S. citizens, there would have been no basis for their arrest.7 Thus, in this case
the ~overnment sought to use secret evidence at the same time that it admitted that
the mdividuals had engaged in no criminal or terrorist activity. Later in the same
case, the INS again tried to use secret evidence to deny two of the eight aliens legalization under an amnesty law. The district court examined the eviaence in camera
and found that it demonstrated nothing other than First Amendment-protected activities. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045, 1069-70
(9th Cir. 1995) (discussing district court finding and noting that the government's
claims of national security were premised not on any individual conduct but on general assertions about the PFLP).
Similarly, the INS initially claimed that Fouad Rafeedie posed a threat to national security because he was a high-ranking member of the PFLP, it allowed him
to remain free on parole, thus unaermining its own claims. And when a district
court granted summary judgment against the INS and held both its use of secret
evidence and a provision of the INA unconstitutional, the government did not pursue further appeals, even though there is a strong presumption in favor of appealing
decisions declaring statutes unconstitutional. Mr. Rafeedie now lives a peaceful and
law-abiding existence in Texas.
Imad Hamad, yet another man accused of posing a na~ional security threat, is
also a permanent resident today. A Palestinian living in Michigan, he was also
charged with bein~ associated with the PFLP, again on the basis of secret evidence.
The immigrlltion Judge reviewed the evidence, but found nothing in it that warranted denying Hamad's application for permanent resident status. On appeal, the
BIA affirmed, and the INS did not seek further review by the Attorney General.
As detailed above, the INS never charged Hany Kiareldeen with any criminal activitr despite claiming that he posed a threat to national security. All seven judges
to VIew the complete record in his case found no basis for the government's claim
that he posed a national security threat, and the INS then declined to pursue its
appeals Nasser Ahmed spent 3 and Y2 years detained, ostensibly as a threat to na. tional security.
7 Hearings before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on the Nomination of William
H. Webster, to be Director of Central Intelligence, tOOth Cong., 1st Sees. 94, 95 (April 8, 9, 30,
1987; May 1, 1987), quoted in American-Arab Anti-Discriminaticn Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045,
1053 (9th Cir. 1995).

,
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When an immigration judge and the BIA both ruled in 1999 that Nasser Ahmed,
an Egyptian man who had been imprisoned for 3 and 1/2 years; should be released
because the INS's evidence did not show that he posed a threat to national security,
the INS initially sought Attorney General review. At the eleventh hour, however
minutes before the deadline the Attorney General set for herself to decide whethe;
Ahmed should go free or continue to be detained, the INS withdrew its request for
Attorney General review. Quite plainly, the Attorney General was not convinced
that Ahmed actually posed a national security threat.
The only person I represent who is still detained on the basis of secret-evidence
is Mazen AI Najjar. We have just filed a habeas corpus petition on his behalf, and
the case is still being briefed. But in his case, too, there are strong reasons to doubt
the government's claims of national security. First, AI Najjar remained a free man
until his deportation hearing concluded, yet the INS has never explained why he
became a threat to national security only after the hearing was complete. He has
been the subject of grand jury investigations since at least January 1996, yet the
government has filed no criminal charges against him or those with whom he is associated. And the only reason that either the immigration judge or the BIA gave
for detaining him as a national security threat was his alleged political association
with a terrorist group-neither the immigration judge, the BIA, nor the INS itself
has ever claimed that AI Najjar himself engaged in or supported any terrorist activity. Matter of Al Najjar, A26-599-077, Bond Decision of Immigration Judge 6 (June
23, 1997); Matter
A1 Najjar, A26-599-077, Bond Decision of BIA 12 (Sept. 15,
1998).
It is my view that the use of secret evidence to deprive an individual of his liberty
or to adjudicate an alien's request to remain here is neerly always unconstitutional.
But even if one believed that it could be used in extreme cases posing extreme dangers, the INS regulations do not restrict it to such cases. On the contrary, the INS
has repeatedly used secret evidence even where it lacks sufficient evidence to charge
any criminal conduct, much less criminal conduct threatening national security.
B. The INS Often. Uses Improperly Classified Evidence, and Only Declassifies it
When Its Actions are Challenged
Whatever one thinks of the validity of secret procedures where evidence is properly classified, we can all agree that there is no justification for the procedure where
evidence does not in fact need to be confidential. Yet the INS has repeatedly presented evidence in camera and ex parte that could and should have been disclosed
from the outset. This is more the fault of the FBI, which is generally the classifying
agency, than the INS, but it is a critical problem with current practices.
For example, in 1998, the INS initially relied on secret evidence to exclude several
Iraqis who were accused of being double-agents after the United SilJtes airlifted
them from Ira~ on the heels of a failed coup attempt against Saddam Hu:;sein.
When former Dlrector of Central Intelligence James Woolsey took their case on and
brought substantial congressional and media pressure to bear on the INS, the government found that it was suddenly able to declassifY over 500 pages of the previously secret evidence. One of the Iraqis initially detained on secret evidence, Dr.
Ali Yasin Mohammed Karim, has now had an opportunity to respond to the declassified evidence, and on that basis the immigration judge in his ;::ase has rever!Jed
herself and tentatively ruled that Dr. Karim is not a threat to national security and
should be granted asylum and released. s
.
.
Similarly, in NaBBer Ahmed's case, the government initially took the position that
it could not even provide a summary of any the secret evidence against him without
jeopardizint:: the national security. Yet when Ahmed filed a constitutional challenge
to the INS s actions, it suddenly found itself able to provide a summary of many
of its charges, and it eventually turned over more than 50 pages of declassified material that had originally been submitted in secret. 1'he fact that the INS was able
to disclose the evidence indicates that there was no need to submit it in secret in
the first place. Moreover, on its face much of the evidence could not possibly have
been properly classified. One allegation, for example, maintained that Ahmed was
associated with Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, but that was hardly a secret, as
Ahmed had served as Sheikh Abdel Rahman's court-appointed paralegal and translator during the criminal trial of the Sheikh. Other evidence initially classified but
ultimately disclosed revealed that the INS's witness in the in camera proceedings,
an FBI agent, argued that Ahmed should be detained because his detention by INS
had made him a hero in the Muslim community and his release would increase his

or

STirn Weiner, "At Rehearing, Iraqi Doctor Wins Round in Deportation," N.Y. Times, May 7,
2000, at A19.
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political stature. Matter of Ahmed, Decision of Immigration Judge and Declassified
Excerpts from Classified Attachment (July 30, 1999).
In still another case, that of Imad Hamad, it turned out that the "secret evidence"
that the INS presented at Mr. Hamad's hearing in 1997 had previously been produced publicly and disclosed to the alien at an earlier stage of the proceeding. When
the INS learned of this, it "decl888ified" the document and submitted it as part of
the open record when the case was on appeal to the BIA. Quite plainly, the document never should have been classified.
These cases illustrate an inherent structural problem. The evidence that the INS
generally presents in secret is not classified by it, but by another agency, usually
the FBI. If the FBI overclassifies, as it apparently did in the cases described above,
the INS has no authority to second-guess the FBrs judgment. Nor does the immigrati.on judge. Moreover, when an FBI agent makes a decision to classify, it is usu_ ally m the context of a counterterrorism investigation, where he is effectively weighing an abstract public right to know against the need for confidentiality of an investigation. In that situation, agents naturally err on the side of classifying. But when
that evidence is then used to deprive an alien of his liberty, there is no requirement
that anyone review the classification decision. In other words, no one aska whether
the classification decision might come out differently when the interest on the otber
side of the balance is not an abstract public right to know, but the very specific interest of a human being seeking to regain his liberty.
\
This structural flaw can lead to years of wholly unnecessary detention. If Nasser
Ahmed had been provided at the outset of his detention with the information he was
ultimately given, he would have been able to put on his defense immediately, and
he would presumably have been released in short order. Instead, when he was initially detained he was told that nothing could be revealed about the secret evidence,
and the immigration authorities, denied any meaningful response from Ahmed, ordered his detention. Only after he had sat for years in prison did.the INS disclose
what could and should have been disclosed at the outset. Thus, here the overclassification literally cost a man years of his life.
C. The INS Uses Secret Evidence Where it Lacks Statutory Authority to Do So
One of the most common uses of secret evidence br INS is to justify detaining
an alien without bond while his deportation hearing IS pending. This ~ractice can
and has resulted in the detention of aliens for years without ever seemg the evidence against them, even where the onJy formal charge against them is that they
o"erstayed their visa. Yet there is no statutory authority for this practice.
Congress has authorized the INS to use secret evidence in a variety of settings,
an i H.R. 2121 seeks to repeal much of that authority, Thus, the INA today authorizes the use of secret evidence to denr various forms of relief from removal, to excluie certain al,'e1's, and to deport "allen terrorists." But the only statutory authoriza tbn to. use secr~t evidence to detain an individual while his deportation proceedings are pending is 8 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2)(B) (1997), which aprlies onJy to "alien terrorists" under special deportation hearings held in the Alien Terrorist Removal
Court. The INS has never invoked the Alien Terrorist Removal Court procedures,
but nonetheless has repeatedly used secret evidence to detain aliens not in those
procedures, and not accused of being "alien terrorists."
D, INS Regulations Do Not Require That the Alien be Provided a Meaningful Declassified SumTTUJry of Secret Evidence
INS regulations permit the use of secret evidence without even providing a summary of the evidence to the alien. While the regulations state that a summary
should be provided when possible, there is no requirement that a summary be provided, or that the summary afford the alien a meaningful opportunity to respond.
See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(16) (1996), 242. 17(a), (cX4)(iv)(1996); 8 CFR
§ 240.1l(c)(3Xiv) (1997). An alien may be told only that secret evidence shows that
he must be detained, without even a hint as to what the evidence consists of or
charges him with. That is the situation Nasser Ahmed faced when he was initially
detained. The INS maintained that it could not tell him anything about the secret
evidence whatsoever. In such a situation, it is literally impossible to present a defense.
'
Where summaries are provided, there is no requirement that they be meaningful.
Thus, when Nasser Ahmed next faced secret evidence, in the course of his deportation hearing, the INS did give him a summary. But the Bummary consisted 801el-t
of the allegation that he had an "888Ociatfon with a known terrorist organization.
Matter of Ahmed, Deportation Decision of Immigration Judge 20 (May 5, 1997) The
INS would not even discloBe the name of the group. The immigration judge correctly
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characterized that summary as "largely useleBBt id., but the regulations impose no
requirement that the summaries meet any standard whatsoever.
The use of secret evidence virtually always makes a meaningful defense impossible, but it indisputably does so where the government does not give the alien notice of the specific allegations alfainst him. Yet in none of the cases in which I have
been involved has the INS proVIded an adequate summary, and there is no regulation or requirement in place to ensure that it do so.
E. The INS Has Failed to Keep Records of Its Secret Evidence Presentations, Thereby
Defeating Meaningful Review
Finally, the INS has failed to keep records of many of its secret evidence presentations. In Ahmed's and AI Najjar's cases, the immigration judges initially took evidence in camera but made no record of the hearing. The absence of a record, of
course, defeats any semblance of meaningful appellate review, particularly where
the hearing was never open to the public so there is no check on government aBBertions regarding what transpired. In these cases, the Board of Immigration Appeals,
an appellate bodYl took new evidence outside the record and again ex parte and in
camera, and basea its decisions on that extra-record showing.
III. SECRET PROCEDURES ENCOURAGE RELIANCE ON QUF.sTIONABLE EVIDENCE

In open proceedings, each party's knowledge that its evidence will be subjected
to cross-examination and reouttal by its adversary creates crucial incentives. It
means that any good advocate will test his or her evidence first, before it is subjected to testing in open court, and will not r'3ly on weak or questionable evidence.
When one knows, by contrast, that the other side will never see the evidence, those
checks do not operate. The INS's track record illustrates that secret procedures invite abuse.
First, the INS has relied heavily in its secret evidence presentations on hearsay,
often in the form of reports drafted by FBI agents relaying accusations by hearsay
sources. In the cases of Nasser Ahmed and Hany Kiareldeen, the immigration
judges harshly criticized the government for its reliance on double and triple hearsay, its failure to provide sufficient information to permit an independent assessment of the allegations, and its failure, when questioned by the immigration judges,
to produce any first-hand witnesses. In effect, it appears that the government
sought to have the immigration judges simply defer to the judgment of its FBI witness that the alien posed a threat to national security.
The Supreme Court and the courts of appeals have held that reliance on hearsay
in immigration proceedings, while not absolutely prohibited, poses serious due process problems because it defeats the i>Ossibility of examining the witnesses. Bridges
v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 172 n.9
(1974) (describing Bridges as holding that due process bars use of hearsay "as substantive evidence bearing on. . . A charge upon which a deportation order had been
based"). Thus, many courts hold that the INS may not present hearsay unless it
first shows that the original declarant is unavailable. See, e.g., Cunanan v. INS, 856
F.2d 1373, 1375 (9th Cir. 1988); Olabanji v. INS, 973 F.2d 1232, 1234-35 (5th Cir.
1992); Dalla v. INS, 765 F.2d 581, 586 (6th Cir. 1985); Kiareideen, 1999 WL 956289,
at *14-*18. Yet the INS relies heavily on hearsay in its secret evidence hearings,
and as far as I know, has never made a showing that the original declarants are
unavailable. The presentation ·:;f ~vidence in secret makes it impossible for the alien
to cross-examine the witnesees ag"inst him. When the secret evidence consists of
hearsay, it is impossible even for th'J judge to question the sources.
Secondt.~he INS has relied on extremely weak evidence in its secret presentations.
In Hany Kiareldeen's case, it appears to have relied principally on accusations made
by Kiareldeen's ex-wife, who was in a custody dispute with Kiareldeen and had
made repeated false accusations against him. Its evidence alleged that Kiareldeen
had hosted a meeting at his Nutley, New Jersey apartment a year and a half before
he even moved into the apartment.
In Nasser Ahmed's case, the FBI initially claimed in its secret evidence that
Ahmed had disseminated to the press a letter from Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman,
who was then in prison, to the press. The letter complained of the Sheikh's prison
conditions, but called for no violence. The FBI claimed in its secret evidence presentation that the letter had nonetheless sparked a terrorist bombing in Egypt. Ahmed
denied disseminating the letter, and proved that many other persons could have
done so. The FBI subsequently admitted that it had no idea who had disseminated
the letter, and the State Department reported that the terrorist incident had nothing to do with the Sheikh, but was a retaliatory attack for an Israeli bombing in
Southern Lebanon. Matter of Ahmed, Deportation Decision of Immigration Judge
and Declassified Excerpts from Classified Attachment (July 30, 1999). In Ahmed's
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case, the FBI ~nt also argued in secret hearinl;rs that Ahmed should be detained
because the INS's detention of him had increasoo his stature in the Arab community, and tha4; as a result upon his release he would be a more effective leader. [d.
Finally, some of the secret evidence in Ahmed's case may have come from the E~
tian government, the very country that the immigration judge found would impnson
and likely torture Ahmed for his affiliations with SheiKh Abdel Rahman if Ahmed
were returned there. [d.
These examples illustrate that one cannot short-circuit the adversary process
without substantial costs, not only to the rights of those against secret evidence is
used, but to the legitimacy of the truth-finding process itself.
IV. THE USE OF SECRET EVIDENCE IS UNNECESSARY AND COUNTERPRODUCTIVE

The government typically responds to the above concerns br. claiming that the
government's interest in national security, coupled with the political branches' "ple_
nary power" over immigration matters, nonetheless justifies the use of secret evidence. But there has never been any showing that national security in fact requires
the use of secret evidence, and the government's track record strongly suggests that
its identification of "national security" concerns is by no means trustworthy.
As I noted at the outset, I have represented 13 aliens against whom the INS
souJdlt to use secret evidence. In all 13 cases, the INS claimed that national security
woUld be threatened. In 12 of the 13 cases, the aliens are now living freely in the
United States, after the INS lost in court and then decided not to pursue avenues
of appeal available to it. The very fact that in these cases the INS di<l. not even pursue all of their appeals only underscores the weakness of the national security
claim. If national security were genuinely at risk, one would expect the government
to leave no stone unturned in its attempt to safeguard the nation.
Even where national security concerns are bona fide, the use of secret evidence
to deprive an alien of his liberty is unconstitutional. It is indisputable that secret
evidence could never be used in a criminal case, whether the crime charged was espionage, sabotage, or terrorism, and no matter how serious the national security
concern. We have survived as' a nation for over 200 years despite our adherence to
that absolute principle. There is no reason to believe that adoption of a similar practice in deportation cases would pose any greater threat.
'
The Supreme Court has made clear that it will not countenance the use of secret
evidence, even where claims of national security are advanced, to deprive aliens living here of their liberty. It refused to permit secret evidence in Kwong Hai Chew
v. Colding, even though the Attorney General had personally determined that the
information could not be disclosed without prejudicing the national interest. 344
U.S. at 592. When faced with INS claims that labor organizer Harry Brid~es's continued residence here was contrary to national security due to his associatlOns with
the Communist Party, the Sup,reme Court nonetheless held that hearsay could not
be used to establish deportability because he must be afforded the opportunity to
confront the evidence against him. Bridges v. Wi.v..on: 326 U.S. 135, 152, 156 (1945).9
As Justice Frankfurter wrote, "[t]he requirement of due process' is not a fair-weather or timid assurance. It must be respected in periods of calm and in times of trouble. H Joint Anti·Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S, at 162.
Finally, the use of secret evidence is counterproductive, even as a tool for fighting
terrorism. It makes error all too likely, meaning that we may well focus on the
wrong people. And more fundamentally, secrecy encourages distrust of government.
And that distrust can itself impede law enforcement. Many aliens in Arab communities are deeply suspicious of federal agents now, and for good reason. Nearly all
of the secret evidence cases of the past five years have involved Arab and/or Muslim
aliens. If we believe that the Arab community is more likely to contain terrorists,
a supposition that as Timothy McVeigh showed, is debatable, the last thing we
should do is adopt tactics that make the entire community view law enforcement
as the enemy.

v.

H.R. 2121 RESPONDS TO THE ABOVE CONCERNS BY REPEALING STATUTORY AUTHORITY
TO USE SECRET EVIDENCE IN DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS AND IN THE ADJUDICATION
OF IMMIGRATION BENEFITS
/

H.R. 2121 provides a direct and straightforward remedy to all of the above problems. It repaals statutory authority for the use of secret evidence in deportation proceedings and the aqjudication of immigration benefits. If enacted, it would accord
91n enacting the deportation provision at issue in Bridges, Congress specifically found that
the Communist Party posed a threat to national security. S.lWp. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess.
788-89 (1950).
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to all aliens the fair procedures now provided to most. Because the use of secret evidence is unconstitutional, unworkable, and unwise, I fully support this remedy.
First, it would repeal authority for using secret evidence to deport aliens. That
authority has only existed since 1996, and has never been invoked by the INS, so
it is quite plain that we can survive without it. This provision would simply place
all aliens living here on equal footing in removal hearings.
Second, it would repeal authority for the government to deny immigration benefits
based on secret evidence. Currently, the INA authorizes the government to deny
even asylum on the basis of secret evidence. In Nasser Ahmed's case, the immigration judge initially found that although Nasser Ahmed had shown his eligibility for
asylum on the public record, because he would be imprisoned and very likely tortured if returned to Egypt, his application had to be denied based on secret evidence
that Ahmed never saw.
Third, the bill would make clear that aliens may not be detained on the basis of
secret evidence while their removal proceedings are pending. As noted above, there
is no existing affirmative statutory authority for this practice under current law outside the Alien Terrorist Removal Court, but the INS maintains that it has the authority implicitly, and therefore it is wise to make clear that no such authority exists.
Fourth, the bill would bar the government from using secret evidence to deny admission to returning permanent resident aliens, individuals paroled into the United
States, and asylum seekers at the border. The bar on use against returning ~erma
nent residents is already supported by Rafeedie v. INS, 795 F. Supp. 13 (D. D.C.
1992). Persons paroled into the United States-and asylum seekers under current law
lack constitutional protection, but the use of secret evidence in these cast's presents
all the same problems that its use presents in-proceedings against aliens who have
entered the country, and accordingly I support this reform as well.
CONCLUSION

The defects of legal proceedings conducted in secret have been recognj,~ed for centuries. In the Bible itself provided that under Roman law, a man c':,arged with
criminal conduct should "have the accusers face to face, and have license to answer
for himself concerning the crime laid against him." 10 Similarly, Wigmore, the noted
expert on evidence, has written that "[flor two centuries past, the policy of the
Anglo-American system of evidence has been to regard the necessity of testing by
cross-examination as a vital feature of the law." 11 It would be difficult to identify
anythin~ more as fundamental to a fair legal process than the right of each party
to examme and confront the evidence against it. When we deny that right to aliens,
we not only denigrate their rights, but demean ow' own system of justice.

Mr. HYDE. Mr: Homburger.
STATEMENT OF THOMAS HOMBURGER, NATIONAL EXECUTIVE
COMMITrEE, ANTI·DEFMiATION LEAGUE

Mr. HOMBURGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good afternoon.
I am Tom Homburger and- I am Vice Chair of the Anti-Defamation
League's National Commission. In the past, I have chaired the
Commission's-the Lea~e's National Civil Rights Committee as
well as the Chicago RegIOnal Board. ADL is pleased to testify today
as the Judiciary Committee considers H.R. 2121.
Together with the American Jewish Congress, B'nai B'rith International, Hadassah and the Jewish Council for Public Affairs, we
represent organizations that have played leadership roles in support of civil rights, liberties and religious freedom in America and
abroad.
We have long stressed America's importance as a haven for persons persecuted in their native land and have strongly supported
broad due process protections for aliens. However, we strongly oppose the approach embodied in H.R. 2121 because it destroys a balActs 25:16 (Kin!!, James).
Wigmore on Evidence 1367 (3d ed. 1940) (quoted in Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 497
(1959)).
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